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Abstract
Why, how and when does mood influence positive testing, that is, the selection of matching questions, when people actively search
for information about others they meet? In four experiments, we demonstrated that happy mood increased positive testing
compared to sad mood. Experiment 1 showed that happy participants were more strongly motivated to get along and smooth the
interaction to come than sad ones. In addition, evidence was provided by a mediation analysis that happy mood increased the
preference for positive testing because of such an improved motivation to get along. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that
happy participants’ preference for positive testing vanished when cognitive resources were limited. The preference for positive
testing appeared under happy mood only when the context made salient the goal to get along (Experiments 3 and 4). Together,
these results suggest that positive testing in a social-hypothesis testing paradigmmay have social values. Copyright# 2009 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Affective states colour how people think and how they use
information when interacting with others. Being happy or sad
influences many steps of information processing, such as
attention to information, selective encoding and retrieval or
evaluative judgment. Surprisingly, however, nearly all of the
research we could cite relies on participants that process
information passively received. What about the impact of
mood on the way people actively gather information about
another person? This question has so far received very little if
any attention. In this paper, we propose to investigate the
moderating role of positive and negative mood on people’s
tendency to engage in positive testing, that is, using matching
questions that focus on the same attributes as the hypothesis to
be tested. Specifically, we are interested in why, how and when
mood influences the way people actively use positive testing
about others they meet.
MOOD, PROCESSING STYLE AND GOAL
PURSUIT
As recently reviewed by Schwarz and Clore (2007; see also
Fiedler, 2000, 2001), numerous studies indicate clearly that
positive mood tends to elicit greater top-down, global and
assimilative style of information processing than neutral or
negative mood states. Negative mood, conversely, promotes
greater bottom-up, local and accommodative processing style.
Indeed, there is no suspense here: compared to negative or
neutral moods, positive mood increases reliance on scripts
(e.g. Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wo¨lk, 1996),
schemas (e.g. Gasper & Clore, 2002), stereotypes (e.g. Bless,
Schwarz, & Kemmelmeier, 1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
Susser, 1994) and leads to greater abstractness in the
representation of behaviours (e.g. Beukeboom & Semin,
2005) and even construal as well as goals (e.g. Labroo &
Patrick, 2009).
One explanation is that mood serves as information about
the value and significance of whatever comes to mind.
According to Clore and Huntsinger (2007), positive mood
validates any accessible cognition or information and as a
matter of fact any dominant response, whereas negative mood
would not or even could invalidate them. In a similar way,
positive mood, compared to negative one, promotes relational
processing (i.e. relating the information to one’s own
expectancy). These propositions are indeed perfectly consist-
ent with the idea that mood is a moderator influencing
processing style by serving as experiential (and bodily)
information regarding what reaction is to be taken with respect
to the situation and/or the target of a judgment. According to
this affect-as-information model (Bless, 2000; Clore &
Storbeck, 2006; Schwarz, 1990), positive mood suggests that
the situation is benign and that the target does not carry any
danger. Because no special action is to be taken, positive mood
leads to top-down use of pre-existing knowledge, such as
category or stereotype. Conversely, negative mood suggests
that the situation and/or the target involve a threat and that
some action is to be taken. This fosters paying attention to the
details of the situation through systematic or bottom-up
information processing in order to (eventually) prevent
negative consequences related to the threat from occurring.
Many scholars have also pleaded for similar ideas; positive
affect instigates an assimilative and approach goal state
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whereas negative affect promotes a more accommodative and
aversive goal state (see for instance, Bierhoff, 1988; Cunning-
ham, 1988; Eisenberg, Losoya, & Spinrad, 2003; Fiedler,
2000, 2001; Gre´goire & Dardenne, 2004; Isen, 1987; Larsen,
McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Schaller & Cialdini, 1990).
Furthermore, a recent research by Fishbach and Labroo
(2007; see also Custers & Aarts, 2005) nicely illustrates the
effect of mood on the pursuit of any accessible goal state. A
goal could be defined as a cognitive representation of a desired
endpoint. These abstract representations can become more or
less accessible through contextual cues and they guide
behaviour toward attainment of these goal states without
necessarily involving conscious planning. According to
Fishbach and Labroo (2007), positive mood, compared to
negative mood, would facilitate adherence to any accessible
goal and then the pursuit of congruent actions. As a matter of
fact, positive mood increases the tendency to adopt goals,
regardless of the exact goal content (precisely, whether it
involves self-improvement or mood management). Although
we very briefly mentioned some studies that manipulated
mood, the majority of the research on mood and goal states has
however studied mood as a consequence of goal pursuit rather
than as a moderator (for a review, see Fishbach & Ferguson,
2007).
In sum, the message seems to be that positive mood means
‘go’ with the activated or accessible information or goal
whereas negative mood means ‘stop’ and then ‘do something
about it’. In this paper, we are mainly concerned with social
interaction. In such a context, what could be the activated goal
state? There are of course many goal states that could be
chased in life, from achievement at school to getting a cup of
coffee. In social interaction also, one could strive for multiple
goals, from appearing likeable and/or competent to appearing
dangerous and/or helpless. However, one prominent goal in
most social interactions, besides accuracy, is certainly to get
along well with others and have a smooth and pleasant
interpersonal interaction (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske,
2002; Snyder, 1992; Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Indeed, relating
to other people, affiliating with them, and maintaining and
creating interpersonal and social links are amongst the most
important basic human needs (Pittman & Zeigler, 2007).
According to the literature we just reviewed, positive mood
should facilitate adherence to the goal of getting along, as this
goal is certainly accessible when one is about to start a social
interaction.
Note that positive affect does not necessarily imply that
happy individuals are lazier than sad individuals. That is,
relying on ‘usual routines’, whatever the information or
cognition coming to mind, or on one’s most accessible goal
state, does not imply that happy individuals are not able or
willing to engage in effortful processing. When the task
demands (Bless et al., 1996) or explicit instructions (Bless,
Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990) require effortful processing,
happy individuals can be motivated to process the information
and to adopt goals requiring cognitive resources (see also
Bodenhausen et al., 1994; Hildebrand-Saints & Weary, 1989;
Isbell, 2004; Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2000; Schwarz, 2002).
This is of course inconsistent with the proposal that positive
mood limits cognitive resources or impairs processing
motivation (e.g. Mackie & Worth, 1989; Schwarz & Bless,
1991).
SOCIAL-HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Importantly, as mentioned above, most of the research devoted
to the influence of affect on cognition has examined people’s
processing style when they are passively receiving infor-
mation. The very few studies that have investigated the impact
of mood on information people seek out about another person
seem however to confirm the idea that, contrary to positive
mood, negative mood leads to favour the most detailed and,
subjectively at least, informative information. However, to the
best of our knowledge, in all these studies, participants had
very poor if any information at all about the target. Isbell,
Burns, and Haar (2005) examined active information search
about a totally unknown target simply called Carol. Similarly,
Hildebrand-Saints and Weary (1989; see also Edwards, Weary,
von Hippel, & Jacobson, 2000) told their participants that they
were about to interview an unknown individual (simply
described as a college freshman) and asked them to cover a
wide range of contents (a rather vague and imprecise task).
The above studies are crucial but they all investigated
information search strategies when people have no clue about
whom the target is. However, very often, people have existing
beliefs, expectationsor ahypothesis inhandabout the interaction
partner. All the experiments reported in the present paper used
the so-called ‘social-hypothesis testing paradigm’ as initiated by
Snyder and Swann (1978). In that paradigm, people decidewhat
kind of information to seek for orwhat kind of questions to ask to
an interviewee about whom they have an expectation. Past
research using that paradigm has shown that, in choosing
questions and conducting interviews, people often ask the target
about features that are consistent with their own expectancy (i.e.
asking ‘Doyou like crowdedparties?’ to anextrovert) rather than
inconsistent (i.e. asking ‘Doyouenjoystayingaloneathome?’ to
an extrovert). Then, independently of mood state, perceivers
preferentially engage in positive testing or matching tendency,
seeking additional information that focuses on the same
attributes as the initial information (e.g. Cameron & Trope,
2004; Johnston, 1996; Johnston & Macrae, 1994; Trope &
Thompson, 1997; see also Friedrich, 1993; Klayman, 1995;
Klayman & Ha, 1987, 1989; Nickerson, 1998).
Research on social-hypothesis testing has also showed that
people who are chronically or momentarily instructed to be
oriented toward the smoothness of the social interaction
displayed an even stronger preference for positive testing
(Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Dumont, Yzerbyt, Snyder,
Mathieu, Comblain, & Scaillet, 2003; Leyens, Dardenne, &
Fiske, 1998; Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Haugen, 1994; Snyder &
Stukas, 1999; Swann & Giuliano, 1987). As suggested by
Leyens, Dardenne, Yzerbyt, Scaillet, and Snyder (1999), a
reason for this is that positive testing might lead perceivers to
feel adapted to the target who, in turn, may experience the
interaction as being personalized. In short, these authors
proposed that positive testing might be a by-product of a goal
to get along with others.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
We expected positive mood to promote a general tendency to
adopt any current goal state that is accessible and, in a social
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interaction context, one such a goal is very probably to have a
smooth and pleasant interaction. Then, happy individuals,
compared to sad ones, should strive more for getting along
with other. Experiment 1 tested whether happy (vs. sad)
mood increases both the motivation to adopt the goal to get
along and the preference for positive testing. Furthermore,
Experiment 1 also tested the hypothesis that positive testing
under happy mood is mediated by the motivation to get
along.
In the rest of the studies, we tested some implications of
our theoretical reasoning. If positive testing is a by-product of
a motivation to get along and if it is a rather effortful and
demanding strategy, then decreasing cognitive resources with
a cognitive load manipulation should impair positive testing
(Experiment 2). Furthermore, we manipulated directly some
contextual factors that should increase the motivation to get
along. (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Jones, 1986; Keltner,
Gruenfeld, and Anderson, 2003) claimed that encountering a
high status person increases attention to reward and
punishment, which makes a social encounter with the
powerful more significant than encounter with powerless
people. We then proposed that the motivation to get along
should be especially high when interviewing a high status
person (vs. equal status, Experiment 3). Similarly, expecting
a face-to-face interaction (vs. not expecting such an
interaction) is certainly a context in which the goal of
getting along should be particularly salient and accessible
(Experiment 4). In both cases, we therefore expected an
increase in positive testing under positive mood when the
context fosters the goal to get along as compared to when the
goal is less salient.
In Experiments 1–4, we also investigated the nature of the
positive testing tendency, under the form of diagnostic and
constraining type of information seeking. Questions are
diagnostic if they discriminate between the hypothesis or
profile and its alternatives and, generally, could be answered
yes or no. For instance, a question like ‘Do you like to tell jokes
in front of others?’ is most likely to be answered ‘yes’ by an
extrovert person but more likely to be answered ‘no’ by a
person who is not an extrovert. Answers to such questions thus
provide direct evidence confirming or infirming the hypoth-
esis. Questions are constraining if they preclude the
interviewee from answering in a complete agreement with
her or his true personality. That is, any answer to that kind of
questions would confirm the hypothesis held. As an example, a
question like ‘What kind of jokes do you often tell in front of
others?’ leads to a variety of answers that will be appraised as
consistent and confirming the extrovert hypothesis. Research
has shown an overwhelming preference for diagnostic
information search, at least when people are motivated to
develop an accurate impression (Devine, Hirt, & Gehrke,
1990; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Skov & Sherman, 1986; Trope &
Bassok, 1983). In contrast, constraining information has so far
received little attention. This may be partly explained by the
fact that such questions are assumed to be rarely used.
However, Leyens (1989) as well as De Dreu and Van Kleef
(2004) provided evidence that constraining questions are
formulated more often during real interview than when
questions are to be selected before an interview. Presumably,
constraining questions might have some values that appeared




Twenty-eight students were told that they would participate in
two ostensibly unrelated tasks. They were told that the first one
concerned the recall of a personal life event (mood induction),
while the second one was briefly mentioned as a short
encounter with a stranger who described him/herself in a very
brief profile (either as an introvert or as an extrovert,N¼ 14 for
each profile).
Procedure
Participants were induced with positive or negative mood by
asking them to recall a happy or a sad recent and vivid event.
The experimenter explained that a colleague of hers, from
another Department, was in the process of constructing a ‘Life
Event Inventory’ that required a large amount of vivid life
events. This mood manipulation has been extensively used in
prior research (e.g. Isbell, 2004; Isbell et al., 2005; Krauth-
Gruber & Ric, 2000). Participants were given approximately
10 minutes to complete the task.
Participants then indicated the extent to which four
adjectives described their current state of mind using a scale
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely well). Thewords ‘happy’ and
‘sad’ were embedded in this list as a check for the mood
manipulation. In an ostensibly unrelated task, in order to assess
participants’ motivation to get along and to smooth the
interaction, they were asked eight questions about how they
intended to behave during the forthcoming interaction.
Inspired by the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad,
1986), these items explicitly assessed the extent to which
participants wanted to get along with the partner and to control
and regulate their self-presentation and expressive behaviours
in order to make the forthcoming interaction smooth and
pleasant on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (totally). Examples of
these items are ‘I’ll do my best to have a pleasant meeting’,
‘I’ll try to make the person feel at ease’ and ‘I’ll try to do what
is necessary for us to have a nice time together’ (a¼ .86).
All the participants believed they were about to ask the
questions themselves to the interviewee in a forthcoming face-
to-face interaction. The experimenter further explained that
this will help her to understand how people conduct an
interview. Participants’ task was then to select questions in
order to form an impression of the interviewee, that is, if the
person is really like the self-description she/he gave on an
introversion/extroversion scale (or profile). On a 21-point scale
anchored with the labels introvert (0) and extrovert (20), the
interviewee had allegedly circled either the number 5 or the
number 15. The labels were accompanied by short definitions
(respectively: inner-oriented, timid and reserved; vs. other-
oriented, sociable and outgoing).
Finally, participants completed the questions selection task
(according to the procedure of Trope & Bassok, 1983, and
Devine et al., 1990). All the participants received 16 cards with
one question written on each. The cards were arranged in a
random order unique for each participant. Participants were
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asked to select eight questions. The list was said to be provided
in order to make the questions selection task easier. They went
through the cards at their own pace and were asked to sort the
questions into two piles: eight questions they did not want to
ask, and eight questions they did want to ask to the interviewee.
The 16 questions were issued from Dardenne and Leyens
(1995; Leyens et al., 1998): eight questions were matching an
extrovert personality and the remaining was matching an
introvert personality. For instance, if the interviewee described
him/herself as an introvert, a matching question would involve
that person’s desire to stay alone whereas a nonmatching
question would involve that person’s willingness to tell jokes
in front of others. Besides, questions were either diagnostic or
constraining. Both diagnostic and constraining questions could
match or not the hypothesis. For instance, an individual who
believes that the interviewee is an introvert may ask ‘Do you
like to work alone?’ (Diagnostic and matching question);
‘What kind of situations makes you feel ill-at-ease and
awkward?’ (Constraining and matching question), ‘Do you
like charades and playing theatre?’ (Diagnostic and non-
matching question); or ‘Why do you like to be in a group with
other persons?’ (Constraining and nonmatching question).
These questions were pretested such that they were as easy to
ask whatever the category (see Dardenne & Leyens, 1995).
When the questions selection task had been completed,
participants were probed for suspicion, thanked and debriefed.
In all the experiments reported in this paper, the experimenters
were trained in clinical psychology and were instructed to pay




As expected, participants were happier after recalling a happy
(M¼ 7.86) than a sad (M¼ 4.93) life event, F(1, 26)¼ 13.86,
p< .001, h2¼ .35. Similarly, participants were sadder after
recalling a sad (M¼ 4.71) than a happy episode (M¼ 1.64),
F(1, 26)¼ 15.32, p< .001, h2¼ .37.
Motivation to Get Along
Answers to the questions about the motivation to get along
with the target during the expected forthcoming interaction
were combined into a single measure. We then submitted it to a
2 (positive vs. negative mood)" 2 (introvert vs. extrovert
profile) ANOVA. Confirming our hypothesis, participants in
the positive mood condition expressed greater motivation to
get along with the target (M¼ 5.83) than participants in the
negative mood condition (M¼ 4.94), F(1, 27)¼ 6.25, p< 05,
h2¼ .21. No other effects were significant.
Questions Selection Task
The number of selected questions were submitted to a Mood
(positive vs. negative)" Profile (introvert vs. extrovert)"
Information search (matching vs. nonmatching)"Question
type (diagnostic vs. constraining) ANOVA. Mood and profile
were between-subjects variables. Information search and
question type were within-subjects variables. Note that with
such a design, the amount of matching plus nonmatching
questions selected necessarily summed to 8 (same for diagnostic
plus constraining questions). Then, the pattern of results for one
kind of questions (e.g. matching) mirrors its counterpart
(nonmatching). Consistent with our hypothesis, more matching
questions were selected by happy (M¼ 4.50) than by sad
participants (M¼ 3.50), as reflected by an interaction between
mood and information search,F(1, 24)¼ 3.88,p¼ .06,h2¼ .14.
No other effects were found. The lack of a three-way interaction
between mood, information search and type of questions, F(1,
72)< 1, indicated that positive mood participants gathered
constraining and diagnostic matching information to the same
extent. Overall though, participants displayed more positive
testing under positive than negative mood.
Mediation Analysis
The mediation hypothesis concerning the effect of mood on
positive testing was examined in a regression analysis
including both moods (coded as #1 if negative and 1 if
positive) and the measure of motivation to get along as
predictors. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), three
relationships must be demonstrated in order to test mediation
(see Figure 1). First, we confirmed that our manipulation of
mood predicted the motivation to get along (b¼ .47, p< .05)
as well as positive testing (b¼ .39, p< .05). Second,
motivation to get along predicted positive testing (b¼ .60,
p< .001). Third, as can be seen in Figure 1, the direct effect of
mood on positive testing was no longer significant when the
motivation to get along was entered into the regression
analysis, b¼ .14, p> .40, whereas the motivation to get along
still predicted the amount of positive testing, b¼ .53, p< .01.
The (conservative) Sobel test further confirmed that the
reduction in the direct effect of mood on positive testing was
significant (z¼ 2.00; p< .05). As a further statistical validation
Figure 1. Goal to get along with the interaction target as a mediator of the preference for matching questions when positive or negativemood is
induced (Experiment 1). Note: Coefficients inside parentheses are parameter estimates for a regression model containing both predictors. $
p< .05; $$ p< .01; $$$ p< .001
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of this mediation, we adopted Preacher and Hayes’ (2008)
bootstrapping procedure (with 5000 resamples). The
advantage of the bootstrapped estimates is that they are not
based on any distributional assumptions regarding the error
terms or, importantly, large sample size. The indirect effect of
mood on positive testing through the proposed mediator was
.33, with a standard error of .14, 95% confidence interval [.092,
.665], which then further validated our mediation hypothesis.
Confirming our hypotheses, the preference for positive
testing (under the form of a higher selection of matching
questions) was due to happy mood increasing people’s
motivation to get along with the interaction target. Consistent
with the idea that positive testing is a way to display empathy
(Leyens et al., 1998, 1999) and to smooth the interaction
(Dardenne & Leyens, 1995), people whowere motivated to get
along with the target (i.e. happy people) manifested a stronger
preference for positive testing when searching for information
about the interaction target. If the motivation to get along is an
active goal state that is more or less demanding and effortful
and if positive testing is the by-product of that goal, then
positive testing should require some cognitive resources.
Therefore, a most convincing test of the hypothesis that happy
people use positive testing because they ‘actively’ follow a
getting along goal should be to manipulate directly the amount




Eighty students participated in two ostensibly unrelated tasks.
Participants were received in groups of up to 4 by a female
experimenter who briefly explained that they would have to
complete two independent tasks that hadbeencombined intoone
single session. The general procedure was the same as for
Experiment 1, except that we did notmeasure the goal of getting
along and that the cognitive load was manipulated. Half the
participants had to keep in mind a set of letters and numbers
while selecting the questions (cognitive load). The remaining
participants (no load) went directly to the questions selection
task.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were first asked to recall either a happy or a sad
life event. Then they completed a mood manipulation check,
that is, how they felt ‘at the present time’, on a 21-point scale
from 0 (very bad) to 20 (very good). Next, they completed the
questions selection task. Half the participants were instructed
that the experimenter wanted to mimic real life interview
settings, in which people ask questions ‘while they are thinking
or doing other stuffs at the same time’. In this cognitive load
condition, participants had 20 seconds to memorize a string of
five letters and five numbers that were written on a sheet of
paper in a random order. They were told that a recall task
would be administered at the end of the session. The remaining
participants were not asked to memorize anything and
proceeded directly to the questions selection task. All
participants believed they were about to ask the selected
questions themselves to the interviewee in a face-to-face
interaction. When the questions selection task had been
completed as in Experiment 1, participants in the cognitive
load condition were asked to write down the string of letters
and numbers. Correct recall was scored if the correct letter or
number was recalled at its correct location in the sequence.
Participants were then probed for suspicion, thanked and
debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check and Recall
As expected, participants who reported a happy life event felt
happier than participants who reported a sad life event
(Ms¼ 15.03 and 11.03), t(78)¼ 5.31, p< .001, h2¼ .27. A 2
(mood: positive vs. negative)" 2 (profile: introvert vs.
extrovert) ANOVA on the correct recall showed no effect
(with a grand mean of 5.50). In particular, happy participants
recalled as many items as sad participants did (Ms¼ 5.43 vs.
5.56), F(1, 36)< 1.
Questions Selection Task
The main results concerned the selection of matching
questions. We conducted a 2 Mood (positive vs. negative)" 2
2 Load (load vs. no load)" 2 Profile (introvert vs.
extrovert)" 2 Information search (matching vs. non-
matching)" 2 Question type (diagnostic vs. constraining)
mixed model factorial ANOVA. Mood, load and profile were
between-subjects variables. Information search and question
type were within-subjects variables.
Participants selected more matching (M¼ 4.85) than
nonmatching (M¼ 3.15) questions, F(1, 72)¼ 33.76,
p< .001, h2¼ .32. A two-way interaction between mood
and information search was also significant, F(1, 72)¼ 10.29,
p< .005, h2¼ .13, which showed that participants selected
more matching questions when experiencing a positive
(M¼ 5.33) rather than a negative mood (M¼ 4.38). Most
importantly, the analyses revealed a significant three-way
interaction between mood, cognitive load and information
search, F(1, 72)¼ 4.10, p< .05, h2¼ .05. As expected, more
detailed analyses revealed that when a positive mood was
induced, participants who were under cognitive load selected
less matching information (M¼ 4.86) than those who were not
distracted (M¼ 5.89), t(38)¼ 3.06, p< .005, h2¼ .20. As can
be seen in Table 1, for sad participants, the load manipulation
Table 1. Number of matching questions selected as a function of
mood and cognitive load (Experiment 2)
No load Load
Positive mood 5.89a 4.86b
Negative mood 4.27b 4.50b
Note: Means with a different subscript are different at p< .005.
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had no effect, t(38)< 1, ns, and both negative mood conditions
led to select fewer matching questions than happy participants
whowere not distracted, t(38) and t(34)> 3.20, ps< .005, both
h2> .21. Whatever distracted or not, participants experiencing
a negative mood selected the same amount of matching
questions than participants who experienced a positive mood
under cognitive load, t(38) and t(42)< 1.30, ns.
The ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of
question type such that participants selected more diagnostic
(M¼ 4.49) than constraining (M¼ 3.51) questions, F(1,
72)¼ 37.04, p< .001, h2¼ .16. Finally, the absence of a
four-way interaction between mood, load, information search
and type of questions, F(1, 72)< 1, ns, further indicated that
when sufficient cognitive resources were available, partici-
pants induced with a positive mood favoured constraining and
diagnostic matching information to the same extent.1
Experiment 2 showed that the preference for positive
testing manifested by happy participants vanished when few
cognitive resources were left available. Because happy and sad
participants recalled as many items in the cognitive load
conditions, differences cannot be attributed to variations in the
cognitive charge both groups suffered. This suggests that
happy participants were motivated to and devoted cognitive
resources in order to actively search for matching information.
Negative mood, in contrast, did not seem to elicit any effortful
strategy in the information search. We now turn our attention to
some contextual factors that should increase the goal to get
along. Indeed, the goal to get along should be especially
strong, that is, accessible and salient, when happy participants
expect a face-to-face interaction with a higher status person.
Therefore, the preference for positive testing should be the
strongest for happy participants who believe in a forthcoming





Eighty-eight students participated in two ostensibly unrelated
tasks. The cover story was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
The target’s status was manipulated such that participants
thought they would select and ask questions themselves, in a
forthcoming interview, to an interviewee whose status was
either equal or higher than their own.
Materials and Procedure
In order to induce positive or negative mood, participants were
asked to provide a written report of either a very happy or a
very sad recent life event. The profile of the target was
presented as in Experiments 1 and 2 but, contrary to these
experiments, participants were told that they would have to
select as many questions as they wished from a list of 16
questions. It was emphasized that they should select questions
until they felt they would have enough information to reach a
decision concerning the interviewee’s personality. Just before
the questions selection task, half the participants were told that
they were about to select questions to be asked by themselves
to an associate professor of the department (high status). The
remaining participants were told that the interviewee was an
undergraduate student (equal status). After the questions
selection task, participants’ mood was assessed through a
manipulation check. Participants were asked to report on a 10-
point scale from 0 (very bad) to 9 (very good) how they ‘feel at
the present time’. As a check for the status manipulation,
participants were asked to rate the interviewee’s status
compared to their own, by circling a number from 1 (lower
than mine) to 7 (higher than mine). Participants were then
probed for suspicion, thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
Participants’ evaluation of their relative status compared to the
interviewee’s one was submitted to a 2 (mood)" 2 (status of
the interviewee)" 2 (profile) ANOVA. As expected, only a
main effect of interviewee’s status was significant, F(1,
80)¼ 19.33, p< .001, h2¼ .20. The status of the associate
professor was rated higher than the status of the undergraduate
student (Ms¼ 5.02 and 3.91). Participants’ self-rating of
happiness was submitted to the same ANOVA. Analysis
showed no significant effect. However, specific comparison
revealed that participants in the positive mood conditions were
happier than those in the negative mood conditions (Ms¼ 7.23
and 6.52), t(86)¼ 1.76, p< .05, one-tailed. Because measured
at the very end of the study, we might suspect that the induced
mood slightly vanished. The same manipulation checks,
applied early in the procedure as in Experiments 1 and 2, have
nevertheless yielded strong effects. The advantage of delaying
the manipulation check of mood is that it did not focus
participants’ attention toward the mood manipulation before
the questions selection task.
Questions Selection Task
On average, participants selected 6.72 questions, that is, they
globally chose 42% of all the questions available to them. We
submitted the total number of questions asked to a
Mood" Status" Profile ANOVA. The interaction between
status and profile was the only significant effect, F(1,
80)¼ 4.90, p< .05, h2¼ .06. Post-hoc tests, however, showed
no significant simple effects (all ps> .29). Following De Dreu
and Van Kleef (2004), indices of the relative number of
constraining or diagnostic questions about introversion or
about extroversion were computed by dividing the number of
questions selected in a particular category by the total number
of questions selected. These four indices were submitted to a
Mood (positive vs. negative)" Status of the interviewee
1Both main effects for question type and information search were involved in a
significant three-way interaction with profile, F(1, 72)¼ 13.82, p< .001,
h2¼ .16. Although the preference for diagnostic over constraining questions
held strongly whatever the introvert or extrovert profile (M¼ 4.82 and 5.59,
resp.), the preference for matching questions is lower for the extrovert profile
(M¼ 4.02) compared to the introvert one (M¼ 4.25), as indicated by an
interaction between information search and profile, F(1, 72)¼ 5.01, p< .05,
h2¼ .07.
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(higher vs. equal)" Profile (introvert vs. extrovert)" Informa-
Information search (matching vs. nonmatching)"Question
type (diagnostic vs. constraining) mixed model factorial
ANOVA. Mood, status and profile were between-subjects
variables. Information search and question type were within-
subjects variables.2
Overall, participants selected more matching (M¼ .62) than
nonmatching (M¼ .38) questions, F(1, 80)¼ 39.36, p< .001,
h2¼ .33. The two-way interaction between status and infor-
mation searchwas significant,F(1, 80)¼ 4.52,p< .05,h2¼ .05.
Participants selectedmore matching questions when confronted
with a high status interviewee (M¼ 0.66) than when they were
confronted with an equal status interviewee (M¼ 0.58).
Importantly, the three-way interaction between mood, status
and information search was also significant, F(1, 80)¼ 4.56,
p< .05, h2¼ .05 (see Table 2). As expected, for happy
participants, those who believed in a forthcoming interaction
with a high status person selected more matching information
(M¼ 0.72) than when expecting to meet an equal status
interviewee (M¼ 0.55), t(42)¼ 3.10, p< .005, h2¼ .19. Sad
participants did not treat high (M¼ .61) and equal (M¼ .61)
status interviewees differently (t(42)< 1, ns) and both selected
significantly fewer matching questions than participants in
positive mood confronted to a high status target, ts(42)> 2.08,
ps< .05, both h2> .09. Whatever the status of the interviewee,
negative mood led to select the same amount of matching
questions than positive mood participants expecting to meet an
interviewee whose status was equal to theirs, ts(42)< 1,
ns. Presumably, specifying explicitly that the partner is an
equal status student did not reveal the same pattern as when the
status of the partner is unknown (Experiments 1 and 2).
The analysis also revealed a significant main effect for
question type, such that participants selected more diagnostic
(M¼ .59) than constraining (M¼ .41) questions, F(1,
80)¼ 21.63, p< .001, h2¼ .21.3 Finally, the absence of a
four-way interaction between mood, status, information search
and type of questions, F(1, 80)¼ 1.24, p> .26, further
indicated that when interacting with a high status target,
mood’s influence was similar for constraining matching
information than for diagnostic matching ones.
As expected, the preference for positive testing revealed the
strongest for happy participants who believed in a forthcoming
interaction with a high status target. Interestingly, sad mood
participants were not affected by the interaction context. That
is, whether the interaction partner was a high status partner or
not, sad mood always led to relatively weak reliance on
positive testing. On the contrary, happy mood led to stronger
positive testing when the interviewee is a high rather than
equal status. In line with Experiment 2, this suggests that
happy mood instigates some ‘active’ and effortful goal states
and strategy involving positive testing.
Nevertheless, some characteristics of the status manipulation
could lead to give credits to alternative explanations. First, it could
be that, under positive mood, a large amount of knowledge about
the interaction target (equal-status target) leads to consider one’s
own expectation, and then positive testing, as less appropriate than
when knowledge about the target is weak (higher-status target).
Indeed, knowing more about a target has been shown to lead to
stereotype dilution (Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981; Yzerbyt,
Leyens, & Schadron, 1997), that is, less reliance on expectations.
Second, it can be assumed that people felt more confident in the
high status than in the equal status person’s self-rating that served
as profile information (maybe simply because higher status
persons are older than students). Greater confidence might then
lead to greater reliance on positive testing because it would appear
as more appropriate in a context where positive mood indicates
safety and allows using top-down processing.
In order to rule out the above alternative explanations, we
reasoned that merely expecting a real face-to-face forthcoming
interaction with an interviewee should make participants’ goal
of getting along particularly salient and accessible. In contrast,
requiring them to select questions to ask while they know that
no real interaction with the person will ever take place should
not stress such a goal. The main purpose of our last experiment
was to rule out alternative explanations and generalize results
of Experiment 3 with a manipulation of the interaction context




Ninety-six students participated in the experiment. As in the
previous studies, participants were told that they would have to
complete two independent tasks that had been combined into
one single session. Half the participants thought they would
simply select questions for the interviewee without interacting
with him/her later on. The remaining participants were made
accountable and responsible for their questions selection as
they thought they were selecting questions they would later
personally ask to the interviewee in a real face-to-face
interaction.
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedure were essentially the same as in
Experiments 1–3. Participants were first induced into positive
or negative mood like in Experiments 1–3, and then their
Table 2. Conditional probability of selecting matching questions as
a function of mood and the interaction target’s status (Experiment 3)
High status target Equal status target
Positive mood .72a .55b
Negative mood .61b .61b
Note: Means with a different subscript are different at p< .05.
2Because proportions are seldom normally distributed, this ANOVA has been
performed using arcsine transformed scores. Results are exactly the same as
with untransformed scores so we decided to report the analyses based on these
untransformed scores.
3This main effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction with
profile and information search, F(1, 80)¼ 15.55, p< .001, h2¼ .16. This
interaction is merely one of degree; although the preference for matching
over nonmatching questions hold strongly whatever the introvert or extrovert
profile (M¼ .64 and .61, resp.), F(1, 80)¼ 2.51, p> .11, the preference for
diagnostic over constraining questions is lowered in the introvert profile
condition (M¼ .54) compared to the extrovert one (M¼ .64), as revealed
by a significant interaction between question type and profile (F(1, 80)¼ 7.77,
p< .01, h2¼ .09).
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actual mood was immediately checked. Participants were
asked to report on a 21-point scale from 0 (very bad) to 20
(very good) how they felt ‘at the present time’. They then
proceeded to the allegedly unrelated questions selection task.
For half the participants, the task was presented as a selection
of questions that would be later asked to the interviewee by the
experimenter herself (no interaction condition). The remaining
participants were told that they would select questions they
would personally ask to a person they were about to meet
(forthcoming interaction condition). Participants selected
exactly eight questions as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Results and Discussion
Mood Manipulation Check
As expected, when checked immediately, participants who
reported a happy life event felt better than participants who
reported a sad life event (Ms¼ 14.46 and 10.02), t(94)¼ 4.89,
p< .001, h2> .20.
Questions Selection Task
Our main analysis concerned the number of stereotype-
consistent questions selected by participants. The design of the
study was a Mood (positive vs. negative)"Context (perspect-
ive of interaction vs. no interaction)" Profile (introvert vs.
extrovert)" Information search (matching vs. nonmatch-
ing)"Question type (diagnostic vs. constraining) mixed
model factorial. Mood, context and profile were between-
subjects variables. Information search and question type were
within-subjects variables.
Analyses revealed that participants selected more matching
(M¼ 4.86) than nonmatching (M¼ 3.14) questions, F(1,
88)¼ 50.00, p< .001, h2¼ .36. The interaction between
information search and mood tended to be significant,
F(1,88)¼ 3.53, p< .07, h2¼ .04, suggesting that participants
experiencing positive mood selected more matching questions
(M¼ 5.10) than participants experiencing negative mood
(M¼ 4.63). The interaction between information search and
context also tended to be significant, F(1, 88)¼ 3.21, p< .08,
h2¼ .04, suggesting that participants who expected a real
interaction with the interviewee favoured matching questions
(M¼ 5.08) to a greater extent than those who did not expect a
face-to-face interaction (M¼ 4.65). Most importantly, con-
ceptually replicating Experiment 3, the analyses revealed a
significant three-way interaction between mood, context and
information search, F(1, 88)¼ 4.56, p< .05, h2¼ .05. As
expected (see Table 3), more detailed analyses revealed that
when a positive mood was induced, those who believed in a
real forthcoming interaction selected more matching questions
(M¼ 5.58) than those who were not expecting to interact
(M¼ 4.63), t(46)¼ 2.66, p< .05, h2¼ .13. When a negative
mood was induced, however, the context had no effect
(M¼ 4.58 for face-to-face and M¼ 4.67 for no interaction,
t(42)< 1, ns) and both led to select fewer matching questions
than positive mood participants who were expecting to have a
social interaction, ts(46)> 2.71, ps< .05, both h2> .14.
Negative mood participants in both contexts selected the
same amount of matching questions than happy mood
participants who did not expect to meet the interviewee,
ts(46)< 1, ns.
TheANOVAalsoshowedasignificantmaineffect ofquestion
type which revealed that participants selected more diagnostic
(M¼ 4.64) than constraining (M¼ 3.36) questions, F(1,
88)¼ 37.04, p< .001, h2¼ .30.4 Again, the absence of a four-
way interaction betweenmood, context, information search and
type of questions,F(1, 88)< 1, further indicated that expecting a
forthcoming interaction or not did not change the mood’s
manipulation effect on the selection of constraining and
diagnostic matching information. Finally, the five-way inter-
action was also significant, F(1, 88)¼ 4.12, p< .05, h2¼ .05.
This five-way interaction suggested that, for happy participants,
the effects of the context on matching information search
(whatever diagnostic or constraining)were strongerwhen facing
an introvert than an extrovert. No other effects were found,
Fs< 1, and in particular, question type (diagnostic vs.
constraining) never interacted with other variables, suggesting
that the preference for diagnostic over constraining questions
maintained stable across the experimental conditions.
Replicating and generalizing Experiment 3, we showed that
the preference for positive testing was stronger for happy parti-
cipants believing that theywould themselves ask the questions to
the interviewee in a forthcoming face-to-face interview than for
any other group of participants. As in Experiment 3, negative
mood led participants toweak reliance on their expectations. On
the contrary, positive mood led to favouring positive testing to a
greater extent when the context conveyed high rather than low
significance. In Experiment 3, several explanations were viable
to account for the observed effect. That is, positive testing could
have varied as a function of the context whenmoodwas positive
because of some specific characteristics of the status manip-
ulation. None of these characteristics were present in
Experiment 4 in which significance of the context was
manipulated through the reality of the interview. Therefore,
Experiment 4 ruled out these alternative explanations for the
effect of mood on information search.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Information gathering is an important part of our daily social
activities. However, most of the research devoted to the
Table 3. Number of matching questions selected as a function of
mood and perspective of interaction (Experiment 4)
Face-to-face interaction No interaction
Positive mood 5.58a 4.63b
Negative mood 4.58b 4.67b
Note: Means with a different subscript are different at p< .05.
4Both main effects of information search and question type were qualified by a
significant three-way interaction with profile, F(1, 88)¼ 7.51, p< .01,
h2¼ .08. This interaction is merely one of degree; although the preference
for matching over nonmatching questions held strongly whatever the introvert
or extrovert profile (M¼ 4.69 and 5.04, resp.), the preference for diagnostic
questions over constraining ones is lowered in the introvert profile condition
(M¼ 4.44) compared to the extrovert one (M¼ 4.83), as indicated by the two-
way interaction between question type and profile, F(1, 88)¼ 3.86, p< .06,
h2¼ .04.
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influence of affect on cognition has examined people’s
processing style when passively receiving information. The
main goal of the present paper was thus to investigate the
influence mood has on the way people actively search for
information in interaction contexts. Wewere interested in why,
how and when mood influences the way people use positive
testing.
In four experiments, we provided the first evidence of the
influence of mood on positive testing, that is, the preference for
information matching one’s own expectations. In all four
experiments, we repeatedly showed that positive but not
negative mood leads people to select matching questions when
expecting a forthcoming interaction. Experiment 1 showed
that happy people were more strongly motivated by the goal to
get along and smooth the interaction than sad people. In
addition, evidence was provided by a mediation analysis that
positive mood increased the preference for positive testing
because of an increased goal to get along with the target.
Hence, this provides at least one answer to the questions about
‘why’ and ‘how’ mood influences the way people actively
search for positive questions.
Experiment 2 also informed us about ‘how’ mood
influences the way people search for matching questions by
showing that happy people devote efforts and cognitive
resources in order to search for these information. Finally,
Experiments 3 and 4 indicated that the strong preference for
positive testing manifested by happy people was conditional to
the activation of the goal to get along well with others. This
goal was improved by the perspective of encountering a high
rather than an equal status person (Experiment 3) and the
perspective of a real face-to-face forthcoming interaction
rather than the perspective of no real interaction (Experiment
4). This provides some answers to the question about ‘when’
mood does influence the way people actively search for
matching information in a social context. At least, Exper-
iments 1, 3 and 4 provided some boundary conditions of
positive testing fostered by positive mood. In all four
experiments, we provided evidence that both diagnostic and
constraining matching information were affected to the same
extent by mood. Presumably, diagnostic questions are thus not
the only ones considered useful. Constraining questions seem
to involve equivalent advantages as diagnostic questions as
soon as they are matching the initial information made salient
about the target (Leyens, 1989; Leyens et al., 1998).
All our results perfectly fit into the framework developed by
Clore and Huntsinger (2007) as well as Fishbach and Ferguson
(2007), amongst others. Compared to negative mood, positive
mood validates any accessible cognition or information (like
one’s own expectation) as well as empowers the most
accessible responses (like getting along well in a social
interaction as well as positive testing). They are also largely
compatible with other framework. Cunningham (1988) or
Fiedler (2000, 2001), for instance, proposed that positivemood
is associated with a motivation or goal to approach others.
Getting along with others and trying to smooth the interaction
certainly also reflects approach behaviours elicited by positive
mood. To the least, such a motivation or goal indicates some
interest for the interaction target and consideration and respect
for the information that she/he provided about his/her
personality. The so-called Gricean’s rules of conversation
(and in particular the cooperation principle, see Grice, 1975)
also support the idea that using other’s self-reported knowl-
edge is adaptive. Indeed, taking into account the information
that the interaction target provides suggests trust and respect in
his or her self-disclosure. Our results are also consistent with
numerous other studies showing that positive mood can
decrease self-focus in self-relevant task (Abele, Silvia, &
Zo¨ller-Utz, 2005), might lead to looking for acceptance
(Carver, Kus, & Scheier, 1994), and might increase trust in an
acquaintance (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Beyond these
theoretical frameworks, we added that these processes are
mediated by a motivation to get along (Experiment 1), need
cognitive resources (Experiment 2), depend on the partner’s
relative status (Experiment 3) and on the reality of the social
interaction (Experiment 4).
Throughout this paper, we firmly refrained from using some
inde´licatesses in the words we used, not using expressions like
‘stereotype’ (when we meant hypothesis to test, or profile) and
‘confirmation bias’ (when we meant positive testing, or
matching questions). Nevertheless, substituting these
expressions, from personality profile to stereotype and from
positive testing to confirmation bias, could further enlighten
our results. It has been argued that stereotype-consistent
information is preferred over stereotype-inconsistent one
because it is seen as more likely to serve social connectivity
function (Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007; see also Brown &
Levinson, 1987; Semin, 2007). For instance, in dyadic
interactions, people spend more time talking about and
express more agreement with stereotype-consistent than
inconsistent information (Ruscher, 1998). As stated recently
by Clark and Kashima (2007), ‘communicating stereotype-
consistent information may convey a message of similarity,
liking, and a general motive to get along, in that it implies the
existence of common ground (p. 1030)’. Obviously, the
message within this literature is very similar to ours.
Although we now have much more precise knowledge
about both the influence of mood on information search and on
the general process through which this might occur, some
questions remain however unanswered. Indeed, even though
we examined quite deeply the phenomenon we were interested
in, future studies should go even further in the investigation of
the ‘why’ question. For instance, although we believe we have
reasonably strong arguments for the role of the motivation to
get along, as we named it, one could advocate that the
motivation to get along is one additional example of a more
basic readiness in good mood to rely on top-down strategies
and to elaborate on the stimulus creatively. As a matter of fact,
as reviewed in the Introduction section, positive mood
increases generative processing, active inferences as well as
self-determined strategies. Then, expecting future interaction
(Experiment 4) as well as dealing with a high status-person
(Experiment 3) could have increased reliance on these
processes. In a related vein, the willingness to get along (as
measured in Experiment 1) might also reflect the more general
readiness of people in a good mood to collaborate ‘on any
game’ and follow demands that would appear suitable in a
given context. As a matter of fact, good mood could also
increase behaviours (such as impoliteness) that may reduce the
likelihood of smoothly getting along with others. This is of
special interest as happy individuals might have the resources
or the backbone to do risky, unpleasant, undesired, impolite,
norm-deviant or otherwise unusual and unethical things (see,
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for instance, Forgas, 1999; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). In
the present set of studies, the goal of getting along is certainly
highly accessible, but many other contexts might make other
goals more accessible.
Examining the consequences of their information search
tendency may also help to better understand happy partici-
pants’ goal. For instance, the benefits for the person asking for
information as well as for the person who is answering the
questions might be very interesting to investigate. A first
potential consequence of favouring positive testing (or
confirming questions) one might think of is the supportive
rather than conflicting atmosphere that these questions convey.
Indeed, positive testing is by nature in line with the partner’s
assumed personality. It is expected to lead the partner to feel at
ease and understood. On the contrary, ‘negative’ testing (or
disconfirming questions) is rather conflicting in nature
precisely because it goes to the opposite direction of the
partner’s assumed personality. Contrary to positive testing, it
reveals the interviewer’s tendency to be systematic in
attempting to discover who the partner really is, at the
expense of getting along with him/her. Although this type of
questions may provide more accurate information about the
partner’s true personality (especially when the partner is not
what she/he is assumed to be) it is also quite risky in terms of
maintaining a pleasant atmosphere during the interaction
(especially when the partner is like what she/he is assumed to
be). For instance, talking about politics with a female
hairdresser (a negative or stereotype-inconsistent testing) is
not a problem and allows discovering who she really is if she is
indeed more intelligent than suggested by stereotypical
knowledge or one’s own expectations. However, if she is in
fact rather uninterested in politics, then such a topic might
make her feel quite ill at ease. Actually, the interviewer might
soon feel rather ill at ease as well!
Given that the tendency to favour positive testing is stronger
when mood is positive rather than negative (though depending
on the context), it could be argued that positive mood leads to
consider the risk of deteriorating the atmosphere as an
unacceptable risk to impair happiness. Of course, such a risk is
certainly the least acceptable when interaction contexts are
significant, which perfectly fits with for our results. However,
future research is needed to provide direct evidence of whether
such a risk drives the information search. Also, it would be
very interesting to know whether positive testing indeed
contributes to positive mood maintenance.
Another potential consequence of favouring positive testing
is the positive impression it gives of the interviewer. Indeed,
De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) showed that being asked
confirming questions (i.e. stereotype-consistent) creates a
more positive image of the interviewer. Consistent with this
idea, Dardenne (2009; Leyens et al., 1999) further demon-
strated that being asked positive questions after providing
information about their own personality led people to provide
more help to the interviewer. Manifesting an increased
tendency for positive testing when experiencing positive
mood may thus again be seen as a way to maintain such a
positive mood state. Being appreciated by others such that they
would provide help may be seen as quite ego-flattering.
Creating bonds between us and others and feeling socially
supported moreover are known to be efficient buffers against
stress and likely contribute to maintain good health and
positive affective states (see, for instance, Gre´goire &
Dardenne, 2004; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988). These
are other aspects that deserve to be investigated in future
research.
All in all thus, although a lot is still to be investigated in this
domain, we provided the very first evidence that mood affects
the way people actively search for ‘stereotypical’ information
(or, more correctly, how mood affects positive testing).
Contrary to negative mood, positive mood increases people’s
motivation to get along and to smooth the interaction, a reason
why they devoted efforts in searching for matching
information. Opposite to what has long been assumed, positive
testing is thus not necessarily a lazy and erroneous strategy (we
are not underestimating the damaging consequences positive
testing might have in some context, e.g. Kassin, Goldstein, &
Savitsky, 2003). Rather, when people possess both the
motivation and the cognitive resources to do the task carefully,
positive mood instigates an active strategy favouring people’s
own expectations in gathering information about interaction
partners.
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